by Cannydc » Tue Jun 19, 2018 5:46 am
A few more damning facts have arisen at the enquiry
Combustible materials were added to the cladding of Grenfell Tower that were not in the design, the public inquiry has heard, while features to stop fire spreading through the facade were missing or installed upside down.
Dr Barbara Lane, a director at the Arup consultancy appointed as a technical expert by the inquiry, made the discoveries during five days investigating the cladding system at the burned-out building.
The decision to use combustible materials to wrap the 24-storey tower has been widely blamed for spreading the fire that claimed 72 lives. Closer inspection has shown the full extent of the flammable materials that were used.
Lane told the inquiry that styrofoam core panels were installed between the new windows and around kitchen vents; ethylene propylene diene terpolymer was used around the new window frames; and polyurethane expanding foam was used to fill joints in the insulation and in gaps between new windows and walls – all combustible materials.
She also found combustible polymeric foam above some windows, even though there was no evidence of it being specified, and polyisocyanurate foam that was not in the design.
She spelled out how the ”stay put” strategy failed just 32 minutes after the first 999 call was made.
She said the strategy did not “consider relevant” the possibility of a multi-storey building fire or one that penetrated multiple flats, despite the fact that more than 100 fire doors inside Grenfell did not meet fire regulations.
In a submission that will support the fire brigade’s position that it was not responsible for the failings of the “stay put” policy, Lane stressed it was “a design condition and … not a fire brigade policy”.
And the fire doors had not been replaced for over 40 years, and would not pass today's safety standards.
A few more damning facts have arisen at the enquiry
Combustible materials were added to the cladding of Grenfell Tower that were not in the design, the public inquiry has heard, while features to stop fire spreading through the facade were missing or installed upside down.
Dr Barbara Lane, a director at the Arup consultancy appointed as a technical expert by the inquiry, made the discoveries during five days investigating the cladding system at the burned-out building.
The decision to use combustible materials to wrap the 24-storey tower has been widely blamed for spreading the fire that claimed 72 lives. Closer inspection has shown the full extent of the flammable materials that were used.
Lane told the inquiry that styrofoam core panels were installed between the new windows and around kitchen vents; ethylene propylene diene terpolymer was used around the new window frames; and polyurethane expanding foam was used to fill joints in the insulation and in gaps between new windows and walls – all combustible materials.
She also found combustible polymeric foam above some windows, even though there was no evidence of it being specified, and polyisocyanurate foam that was not in the design.
She spelled out how the ”stay put” strategy failed just 32 minutes after the first 999 call was made.
She said the strategy did not “consider relevant” the possibility of a multi-storey building fire or one that penetrated multiple flats, despite the fact that more than 100 fire doors inside Grenfell did not meet fire regulations.
In a submission that will support the fire brigade’s position that it was not responsible for the failings of the “stay put” policy, Lane stressed it was “a design condition and … not a fire brigade policy”.
And the fire doors had not been replaced for over 40 years, and would not pass today's safety standards.